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case such a result is impossible. The only solution of this problem
seems to be a definite statutory enactment by the legislature, permitting attachment of the property of a nonresident respondent in
a divorce action. Such statutes exist in a number of states, a good
example being that in Massachusetts, 9 and it is suggested that the
West Virginia legislature should enact such a statute.
J.E . C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

BANKRUPTCY

-

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Wright, a Virginia
THE AtENDED FRAZIER-LEmKE ACT.farmer, petitioned for relief under the amended Frazier-Lemke
Act,' providing for a three-year debt moratorium for insolvent
farm owners. A mortgagee moved that the case be dismissed on the
ground that the Act was unconstitutional in that it effected a deprivation of creditors' property without due process of law. The
district court sustained the motion,2 and the judgment was affirmed
by the circuit court of appeals.' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held, that the amended Frazier-Lemke Act is constitutional, not being in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Judgment reversed. Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va.4
The first Frazier-Lemke Act' provided that if a farmer were
unable to obtain a composition under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy
Act,0 his property should be appraised, and he might, if the
creditor consented, purchase the property at the appraised value,
agreeing to make deferred payments of the purchase price. If the
creditor refused his assent, all proceedings should be stayed for
five years, the debtor retaining possession of the property under
the supervision of the court, paying a reasonable rental. At the
end of five years the debtor might pay into court the appraised
value of the property and be discharged. The Supreme Court held
this Act unconstitutional in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
OF

9 "Upon a libel by a wife for divorce for a cause accruing after marriage,
the real and personal property of the husband may be attached to secure suitable support and maintenance to her and to such children as may be committed
to her care and custody." Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, c. 208, § 12.
149 Stat. 943-955 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (s)
2
In Te Sherman, 12 F. Supp. 297 (1935).

(1927).

3 Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Co. of Roanoke, Va., 85
F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
4 57 S. Ct. 556 (1937).
5 BANiupTOY AcT § 75(s), 4S Stat. 1289 (1934).
6 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (1927).
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Radford on the ground that it violated the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment.
Shortly after the Radford case, the Frazier-Lemke Act was
amended, the essential changes being: (1) the provision as to
creditors' assent was abolished; (2) it was specifically stated that
the creditor's lien should not be impaired; (3) whether the debtor
in any specific instance was entitled to relief was left within the
discretion of the district court; and (4) the moratorium was reduced from five to three years. The new Act also provided, (5)
that at the end of the three year period the debtor might pay into
court the appraised value and keep the property, this section being followed by a proviso which proved a little troublesome to
interpreters, i.e., "Provided, That upon request in writing by any
secured creditor or creditors, the court shall order the property upon which such secured creditors have a lien to be sold at public
auction," the debtor being given a ninety days equity of redemption. There was a question as to whether the creditor might
do this at any time or only after the expiration of the three year
stay. It is now settled that the creditor may exercise this power
only at the end of the moratorium. 8 The last paragraph of the
Act states that the Act is an emergency measure and if the emergency ceases to exist, the court may, in its discretion, shorten the
stay of proceedings provided for.
The Radford case9 enumerated five property rights given to
the creditor by the state law of which he was deprived by the
original Frazier-Lemke Act. They were: (1) the right to retain
the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured was paid; (2) the
right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale; (3)
the right to determine when such sale should be held, subject only
to the discretion of the court; (4) the right to protect its interest
in the property by bidding at such sale whenever held, and thus
to assure having the mortgaged property devoted primarily to the
satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt of the proceeds of
7295 U. S. 555, 55 S.Ct. 854 (1935).
8 See In re Chilton, 16 P. Supp. 14 (1936) holding that the provision should
be interpreted to give the creditor the right to an immediate sale, abrogating
the three year moratorium, on the ground that this construction is consonant
with its constitutionality. Contra: In re Young, 12 F. Supp. 30 (1935), in
which it is pointed out that if the creditor could immediately demand a sale,
the debtor could himself complain of unconstitutionality in that his equity of
redemption would be reduced from the time given by the state statute (one
year in this case) to niney days.
OLouisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 55 S. Ct.
854 (1935).
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a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself; (5) the
right to control meanwhile the property during the period of default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the
rents and profits collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the
debt. It was generally agreed that the amended Act secured rights
numbered (1), (2), and (4), but a majority of the district and
circuit courts seemed to be of the opinion that the creditor was
deprived of the right to determine when the sale should be held
and the right to control the property during the period of default,
and these courts also interpreted the Radford case to mean that
deprivation of any one of the five enumerated property rights
would invalidate the Act." 'Mr. Justice Brandeis, referring, in the
Wright case,' to the Radford case, states: "The opinion enumerates five important substantive rights in specific property which
had been taken. It was not held that the deprivation of any one
of these rights would have rendered the Act invalid, but that the
effect of the statute in its entirety was was to deprive the mortgagee
of his property without due process of law."
Until the passage of the first Frazier-Lemke Act, Bankruptcy
legislation had normally operated to discharge the debt,. leaving the
security for the debt unaffected. This Act was held unconstitutional in that it impaired the security to too great an extent by
depriving the creditor of five rights in the security. The case
holding the Act unconstitutional" seemed to create the impression
that the impairment of any of these rights would not be tolerated.
but it was held in the Wright case that the creditor might constitutionally be deprived of two of the enumerated rights. Somewhere between these two decisions lies the verge of constitutionality, in so far as disturbing these security rights is concerned.
Whether one or more of the rights remaining to the creditor may
be taken singly or in combination with those of which he has already been deprived remains to be answered.
H. A. W.
o Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 85
F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; LaFayette Life Ins. Co. v. Lowvmon, 79 F.
(2d) 887 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); United States National Bank of Omaha v.
Pamp, 83 F. (2d) 493 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936); Steverson v. Clark, 86 F. (2d)
330 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); Knott v. First Carolinas Joint Land Bank, 86 F.
(2d) 551 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936); McWilliams v. Blackard, 86 F. (2d) 328 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1936); In re Young, 12 F. Supp. 30 (1935); In re Lindsay, 12 F.
Supp. 625 (1935); In re Weise, 12 F. Supp. 871 (1935); In re Davis, 13 F.
Supp. 221 (1936); In re Diller, 13 F. Supp. 249 (1935); In Te Tschoepe, 13
F. Supp. 371 (1936); In re Schoenleber, 13 F. Supp. 375 (1936); In re Wogstad, 14 F. Supp. 72 (1936); In rc Maynard, 15 F. Supp. 809 (1936); In re
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